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In this paper, I discuss two 1835 ordinances passed by the local council of the
British colony of  Mauritius. Passed shortly after Britain’s 1833 Slavery Abolition
Act, these restrictions initiated the regulation and restriction of immigration within
the British Empire. Seen as quite novel in their day, these ordinances employed the
rhetoric of ‘protecting emigrants’ to legitimise the new constraints they imposed
on free human mobility. Today, when the national ‘logic of  constraint’ on human
mobility is almost uncontested, the idea that immigration controls protect migrants
remains central to the discursive practices concerning human trafficking. Nation-
state constraints on human mobility are normalised while the exploitation and
abuse of people on the move is ideologically redirected to ‘modern-day slavers’ or
‘evil traffickers’, thus absolving both the state and globally operative capital of their
culpability.
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Introduction
To better understand and historically situate efforts to end ‘human trafficking’ or
‘modern-day slavery’, I examine the period in which regulations and restrictions on
free human mobility into state territories—immigration controls—were first enacted.
This is important for at least two reasons. First, like today’s anti-trafficking policies,
the initial, nineteenth-century organisation of border controls centred a narrative
of  ‘rescue and protection’ in order to normalise the regulation of  people’s
immigration, a practice seen as wholly novel and an illegitimate exercise of state
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power at that time. Second, without the all-encompassing system of contemporary
nation-state controls on human mobility, the intermediaries that people currently
rely on to facilitate their movement into state territories—and the opportunities
for a livelihood located there—would lose much of their power.
The beginning of  the end of  relatively free immigration, i.e. lawful entry into a state’s
territory, is not a timeless and integral element of  a state’s sovereignty, or even a
characteristic of  the sovereignty of  a territorial state as set out by the 1648 Treaty of
Westphalia; it is a part of  the politics surrounding the abolition of  slavery within
the British Empire. Immigration controls are intimately connected to the replacement
of the slave trade with the pejoratively termed ‘coolie’ labour trade in indentured,
contract labour, mostly from British-colonised Asia.1 The ‘coolie’ labour system
rested on a legal requirement for workers to labour for a contracted period of time
(usually five years but sometimes shorter or longer). During this period, they were
tied to the contracting employer and were not free to change either their employer
or place of work.2 The ‘coolie’ system of labour recruitment acted as a bridge
between what Radhika Mongia terms the imperial-state ‘logic of facilitation’ of
human movement and the national-state ‘logic of constraint’.3 By examining the
emergence and growth of regulations and restrictions on human mobility within
the politics of  anti-slavery, efforts to discipline labour and the growing power of
nationalist discourses over capitalists, workers, and colonial officials, we can evaluate
both the claims made and the solutions offered by contemporary anti-trafficking
frameworks which purport to assist migrating people.
The first regulations governing mobility within the British Empire were enacted in
1835 in the colony of Mauritius against ‘coolie’ labourers moving from one part of
the Empire (British India) into another (British Mauritius). These first immigration
controls were brought in through a range of concerns, some of which were
conflicting and contradictory, but most of  which intended to secure a new labour
force for sugar plantation owners on the island of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean,
about 2,000 kilometres off the southeast coast of continental Africa. The London
colonial office was intent on constructing a labour recruitment system that would
replace slavery, but one that would not be portrayed as such by abolition activists.
With the impending end of slave labour relations, the local Mauritian colonial
authorities were intent on sufficiently disciplining the workers brought in from
British India. Meanwhile anti-slavery campaigners signalled their intent to ‘protect’
1 The term ‘coolie’ has from the start been imbricated with deeply racist meanings.
Hence, my placement of it within quotes.
2 L Potts, The World Market for Labour Power: A history of  migration, Zed Books, London,
1990, p. 79.
3 R V Mongia, ‘Historicizing State Sovereignty: Inequality and the form of equiva-
lence’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 49, no. 2, 2007, pp. 384–411.
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‘coolies’ from would-be slavers. Regulating and restricting the entry of those
recruited as indentured contract labour through the emergent ‘coolie’ labour system
addressed all of these concerns. Such controls precipitated a new world order of
nation-state regulations and restrictions of  human mobility, one that has created
many crises for people trying to move ever since, especially those seeking new
livelihoods.
Of  course, at the time, no one working in the British imperial-state’s wide and
dispersed apparatus could have known the long-range consequences of regulating
the entry of British subjects from one part of its territories into another. Such
regulations were initially piecemeal strategies imposed only on those moving
through the ‘coolie’ labour system in response to economic and political crises of
the moment. Nonetheless, the imposition of immigration restrictions on ‘coolie’
labourers emerged as a key part of  the British imperial state’s response to the
threats to both its power and imperial trade posed by the abolition of the slave
trade in 1807 and of slave labour relations in 1833.
Imperial Logic on Human Mobility
All states are concerned with controlling people’s mobility in one way or another—
and they are interested in doing so for largely the same reasons. In this section,
however, I lay out the different forms of mobility controls exercised by imperial
states and by nation states. The distinction between the two, I believe, tells us
much about the contemporary discourse—and nation-state practice—of ‘anti-
trafficking’. Imperial states ruled by making those subjected to their powers of
taxation, levies, and forced labour into subjects of their empire. Generally speaking,
the more subjects the state had within its territories, the more persons whose
labour it could exploit, the more wealth it could amass, and the more power it
could wield. Imperial states’ concerns about borders and boundaries were, thus,
primarily about preventing people from leaving. Holding people in its imperial
territories was the sine qua non of its project of ‘civilising’ people (‘civilisation’
always having been an effect of state power). This was never an easy task. Many
would-be imperial subjects, keen on making an escape, practised what James Scott
has nicely termed ‘the art of  not being governed’4 and carved out non-state spaces
for themselves wherever, whenever, and for as long as they could. Thus, in contrast
to the Hobbesian story of  sovereignty, where states were purportedly created by
people to protect themselves from the violent chaos of an ‘uncivilised’ (i.e. stateless)
life, in actuality, gaining sovereignty over people entailed much violence.
4 See: J C Scott, The Art of  Not Being Governed: An anarchist history of  upland Southeast
Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2010.
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Even for those unable to escape, however, imperial states were not interested in the
wholesale immobility of their subjects. Rather, imperial states facilitated the movement
of people into and across their empires. Indeed, imperial states were actively involved
in such movements, often on a massive scale, even as they then immobilised most
people through labour relations of unfreedom. European empires, since the late
fifteenth century, actively engaged in moving people through systems of  slavery,
impressment, debt bondage, penal transport, servitude, and, in late imperialism,
immigration regimes. All of these were structural elements of imperialism.5 Indeed,
facilitating human mobility was crucial for the profitability of imperial territories,
particularly as colonialism resulted in the high death rates of the colonised, itself
often a result of their enslavement.6 Moreover, the high death rate of enslaved
persons from Africa, from Europe and Asia indentured labourers, and even of so-
called free labour, also required an ongoing replenishment of labour power in the
colonies.
One of the first main systems of moving people within a rapidly globalising space
of imperialism was the trade in slaves from largely the west coast of Africa, a labour
system that was dramatically altered with the introduction of capitalist market
imperatives. The world-historical shift that came with the delegitimisation of the
slave trade and of slavery itself was undoubtedly the result of the centuries-long
and countless acts of rebellion of the enslaved, along with the efforts of those
who joined them in an organised movement to abolish slavery. In the late
eighteenth century, these latter efforts intensified and did so from within the centre
of the British Empire itself—the City of London.7 With its 25 March 1807
Abolition of  the Slave Trade Act, the British Empire ended its trade in slaves from
Africa. Yet, due to the heavy reliance on slave labour by plantation owners and the
imperial treasury, the institution of  slavery itself  was maintained within the
Empire for several decades afterwards, and in some imperial territories even for
several years following the passing of  Britain’s Slavery Abolition Act of  1833.
5 Potts, p. 204.
6 A Res ndez, The Other Slavery: The uncovered story of  Indian enslavement in America,
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016; B Rushforth, ‘“A Little Flesh We Offer You”: The
origins of  Indian slavery in New France’, The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 60, no.
4, 2003, pp. 777–808; L Behrendt, as interviewed in Servant or Slave, DVD, directed
by Steven McGregor, No Coincidence Media, 2016; M Tate and F Foy, ‘Slavery and
Racism in South Pacific Annexations’, The Journal of  Negro History, vol. 50, no. 1,
1965, pp. 1–21.
7 A Hochschild, Bury the Chains: Prophets and rebels in the fight to free an empire’s slaves,
Houghton Mifflin, New York, 2005; P Linebaugh and M Rediker, The Many-Headed
Hydra: Sailors, slaves, commoners, and the hidden history of  the revolutionary Atlantic, Beacon
Press, Boston 2000.
ATR #9-2017---08-Film.pmd 1/1/2545, 7:1934
N Sharma
 35
The main reason for the decades-long gap between the end of the British slave trade
(1807) and the end of slave labour relations (1834–1843) was the search for a system
of labour recruitment that could replace it and do so in a manner that met investors’
demands for a cheapened and weakened workforce. The central issue was that of
rights. What, if  any, rights would the workers recruited to replace enslaved workers
have after the abolition of slavery? And from where would these workers be
recruited? In this there was no uniform response. The post-abolition period saw a
dramatic increase in people recruited from Europe for a variety of work. They did
not face any restrictions on their movement to the places they came to until well
into the twentieth century. However, by the early nineteenth century, the growing
numbers of workers arriving from Europe were less and less likely to be employed
in unfree employment relations.8 Moreover, already by the seventeenth century—
and certainly by the end of the eighteenth century—a racialised division of labour
had been established, resulting, amongst other things, in a highly differential pay
scale between workers racialised as white and those racialised into various categories
of  non-whites. This was especially the case in the ‘white-settler colonies’ (e.g. United
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) where the ratio of whites to non-whites
had been reversed earlier on. The higher ‘wages of whiteness’ meant that the search
for the most profitable way to replace enslaved workers did not end with the
increase in people from Europe.9 The new-found freedom of white male workers
from conditions of indentureship resulted in a substantially lessened ability for
employers to exercise control over them. Free labour relations, politically
empowering to (mostly white male) workers, were seen to be too costly by
employers. In any case, white people did not migrate in large numbers as workers
outside of the ‘white-settler colonies’.
8 It is estimated that more than half of all persons moving from Europe to the English
colonies of North America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries came as
indentured servants (see Potts). Some of the workers brought to replace slave labourers
in the New World came from Europe. However, until the abolition of  the slave
trade in 1807, the number of Africans throughout the Americas outstripped the
combined total of Europeans by a ratio of 3:, 4:, or even 5:1. Between 1492 and
1820, while approximately ten to fifteen million Africans were forcibly brought to
the New World, only two million or so people from Europe had made the journey.
This only began to change after the abolition of the African slave trade and, even
then, only in the 1820s. See: J Steinfeld, The Invention of  Free Labour: The employment
relation in English and American law and culture, 1350–1870, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill and London, 1991.
9 D R Roediger, The Wages of  Whiteness: Race and the making of  the American working
class, Verso, London, 1999.
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The Abolition of Slavery and the Start of Coolieism
The more effective ‘solution’ to the problem that imperial states and capital investors
faced with the end of slavery was the ‘coolie’ system: the system of recruiting and
exploiting already negatively racialised people, mostly men, and mostly from British-
controlled China and India, to work in conditions of  indentured servitude.10
Indeed, coolieism became the dominant system through which people were moved
within the world market for labour, from approximately 1830 to the 1920s.11
While there is no definitive number of how many people were moved as ‘coolies’—
some estimate a low of 12 million while some argue that ‘an estimate of 37 million
or more would not be entirely without foundation’—the scale and significance of
the ‘coolie’ system were, even with the lowest estimates, comparable to those of
slavery.12 Indeed, the ‘coolie’ system surpassed African slavery in its intensity, as
millions of ‘coolies’ from Asia were recruited and exploited within the range of
slightly less than a hundred years (1830s–1920s).13
While Britain’s Slavery Abolition Act of  1833 did not go into effect in the territories
controlled by the East India Company (or Ceylon) until 1843, the introduction of
capitalist social relations in British India and British-controlled China resulted in a
‘surplus population’ desperate for a livelihood. Increasingly, most people had to
engage in capitalist markets, including for labour, for their continued existence, and
by the 1830s and 1840s, millions of people were ripe candidates to be exploited as
‘coolies’ throughout the British Empire in Asia, Africa and the Americas.
As they were moved throughout the British Empire, the relationship of ‘coolies’
to the still- or soon-to-be former slaves—and to the institution of slavery—was
called into question. The main question was whether coolieism was a new form of
slavery or not. As I discuss below, distancing coolieism from slavery formed the
foundation for the establishment of immigration regulations and restrictions in
the British Empire. In other words, it was the impending end to slave labour
relations which led to the enactment of the very first controls on in-migration.
And, it was against ‘coolies’ from Asia, employed on contracts of indenture, that a
growing list of regulations to monitor the mobility of co-imperial subjects were
first ordered.14
10 The India Act of 1858, inaugurating the period of British rule referred to as the Raj
(or British India), transferred authority over most parts of the South Asian subcon-
tinent from the British East India Company (which had ruled it from 1757) to the
British Crown. Under the 1842 Treaty of  Nanking, the British gained direct control
over Hong Kong and Canton, Shanghai, Amoy, Fuzhou and Nigbo were opened up
as nodes in the British-organised and controlled trade in opium.
11 Potts, p. 69.
12 Potts, pp.71–73.
13 Potts, p. 73.
14 Potts, pp. 68–71.
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Specifically, as Radhika Mongia’s study shows, it was in the British colony of
Mauritius where the first efforts to regulate the immigration of co-British imperial
subjects took place. It was a monumental shift, one that generated much heated
discussion at the time.15 The local colonial government of  Mauritius’s effort to
regulate and restrict the entry of ‘coolie’ workers from British India marked a shift
from imperial concerns about exit to new concerns about entry. In retrospect, it was
the beginning of the end of the regime of the unrestricted entry of British subjects
within imperial territory and, in a sense, the start of ideas of a fragmented imperial
space, ideas which would fuel nationalist movements in the colonies, and eventually,
in the metropoles of the Empire.
People from Africa had been enslaved on Mauritius since the emergent Dutch
Empire first colonised it (1638–1710). Slavery there continued under the French
(1710–1810) and under the British during its period of great expansion in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On the eve of the British conquest of
Mauritius in 1810, there were some 63,000 enslaved workers there.16 Sugar
plantations reliant on slave labour from Africa soon became the mainstay of the
colonial economy. As the date for the abolition of  slave labour relations on Mauritius
in 1835 drew near, however, local British colonial officials became increasingly
concerned about maintaining the profitability of the colony and, therefore, its
attractiveness to investors.17 In particular, given the harsh working conditions
prevalent on sugar plantations, they did not believe the planters’ intent to recruit
workers from India to replace the soon-to-be freed slaves would solve the problem
of securing a necessary labour force. This led the colonial government to look for a
measure to immobilise the new workforce. Forcing enslaved people over the age of
six to work for another three to five years as ‘apprentices’ temporarily accomplished
this with regard to slaves, but the same measure did not solve the ‘problem’ of the
newly freed workers from British India.
In 1835, the same year that slaves were freed on Mauritius, two ordinances regulating
the migration of people from British India were passed by the local British Council
(and ratified in 1837 by the British Parliament).18 These ordinances, meant to
regulate and discipline ‘coolie’ workers from India, would only admit ‘coolies’ who
had permission from the governor of  the colony. This restriction limited the
hitherto free mobility of  ‘coolie’ labour from British India who, it is well worth
remembering, were co-imperial subjects, theoretically on par with all other British
15 Mongia.
16 R B Allen, Slaves, Freedmen and Indentured Labouers in Colonial Mauritius, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 13.
17 With the abolition of slavery on Mauritius, the planters, not the enslaved, received
a compensation of  two million pounds sterling.
18 Mongia, p. 399.
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subjects. The Mauritius ordinances made a break with the previous imperial practice
concerning migration. Indeed, such interventions were viewed as wholly novel and
lacking in legal precedence. The imperial office admitted as much when it stated that
‘this practice [of regulating migration] has no foundation in any existing law’.19
The shock of such mobility restrictions affected planters as well. They feared that
these would be used to limit the number of workers they could recruit from
British India. Consequently, one planter, Hollier Griffith, used the argument that
any intervention into the movement of  workers from India was unprecedented.
Writing to G. F. Dick, the Colonial Secretary of  Mauritius, Griffith noted that the
imperial state might prohibit the departure of a British subject from British territory
(but even then only in ‘exceptional cases’); however, he maintained, the state’s
sovereignty did ‘not extend so far as to prohibit the entrance into his dominions of
any of his subjects’.20 In other words, he argued that regulations and restrictions
on immigration were not the purview of  the British imperial state. In response,
Mr Prosper D’Epinay, the newly appointed Protector General of  Mauritius, defended
the right of local Mauritian authorities to impose entrance restrictions on each new
migrant, and argued that the ordinances were ‘a measure of foresight and of
internal police’ without which there would be ‘tumult and disorder [rather] than
[an] increase in [the] industry of the country’.21
Clearly concerned about the changes wrought by the end of slavery on Mauritius
and the colonial officials’ desire for a disciplined labour force, D’Epinay further
argued that,
wise and prudent precautionary measures [should] be taken …
when this new population is put into immediate contact with
the new apprentices just emerging from slavery, still susceptible
of every impression; and to whom it is of importance, at the
first step towards civilization, to give [an] idea and examples of
order, labour, discipline. This end would be frustrated, if per-
mission were given to associate them with all the vagabonds and
all the idlers with which India swarms…. Who can say what
influence this medley of individuals, with their manners, their
usages, and their vices will have on our indigenous population,
especially when it shall become wholly free? … It is the part of a
wise Government to give to it serious attention; it is, therefore,
necessary to proceed with caution in the new order of things.22
19 Mongia, p. 399.
20 Mongia, p. 400.
21 Mongia, p. 401.
22 Mongia, pp. 401–402.
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His claims for a ‘new order’ were not hyperbolic. In retrospect, the Mauritius
ordinances were a striking shift in British policies on movement within its Empire.
Significantly, while bowing to the still dominant (and formal) notion that British
Indian subjects had the same rights as ‘those who reside in any possession, territory,
or dependency of  Great Britain’, D’Epinay, defended the elimination of  this formal
equality when he asked whether, ‘the term British subject, and the privileges attached
to it, are not according to places and circumstances, susceptible of important division
and modification’.23 In the negotiations between colonial authorities on Mauritius
and in London, the view in favour of regulating and restricting the movement of
people from British India to British Mauritius won out and was the start of
juridical distinctions between who could and could not move freely across the space
of the British Empire. From 1835 to 1838, approximately 25,000 ‘coolie’ labourers
from India were shipped to Mauritius—of whom 7,000 died—thus alleviating
planters’ concerns that immigration ordinances would curtail the supply of labour.
Yet, although the Mauritius colonial officials were enthusiastic about immigration
controls, neither the British Indian government nor the London Office were
convinced. With the success of the slavery abolition movement, they felt it was
crucial that the new ‘coolie’ labour recruitment system not be viewed as a new form
of  slavery. Nonetheless, realising the singular importance of  ‘coolies’ for planters,
both sets of colonial authorities came to support the Mauritius colonial
government’s regulations and restrictions on them. They did so by expanding the
limits placed on their mobility by adding emigration controls to the immigration
controls of  the Mauritius colonial government. Importantly, both sets of  controls
were carried out in the name of protecting ‘coolies’. The British presented them as
necessary to ensure both that the movement of ‘coolie’ workers from British India
was ‘voluntary’ and that they were ‘freely’ selling their labour power. People’s free
mobility across British imperial territories, such logic held, had to end in order to
ensure that British subjects remained ‘free’ workers. In the process, the coercion
inherent in the making and reproduction of a capitalist labour force was obfuscated.
Indeed, precisely to deflect challenges from anti-slavery campaigners, the hallmark
of state regulation of Indian ‘coolie’ labour was the state-authorised labour contract
each emigrant was required to sign.24 Adding to the new, emergent regime of
23 Mongia, p. 401.
24 Contracts for labour (or service) were, of course, not exclusively used against ‘coolie’
labour from British India. An 1823 United Kingdom Act which bound workers to
their employers through labour contracts described its purpose as ‘the better regulations
of servants, labourers and work people’. This particular act influenced employment
law in Australia (an 1845 Act), Canada (1847), New Zealand (1856) and South
Africa (1856). As with contracts of indenture applied to ‘coolies’, these acts were
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‘paper walls’,25 in 1837 British Indian government regulations laid down specific
conditions for the lawful movement of people leaving British India from Calcutta,
a main port of the ‘coolie’ labour trade. The would-be emigrant and his (or less
often, her) newly-minted Emigration Agent were required to appear before an
officer designated by the colonial British Government of India with a written
statement of the terms of their labour contract. Under ‘coolie’ contracts of
indenture, the length of work was to be five years, renewable for further five-year
terms. The emigrant was to be returned at the end of  his or her service to the port
of departure. Each emigrant vessel was required to conform to certain standards of
space, diet, etc. and carry a medical officer. In 1837, this scheme was extended to the
city of Madras.
The labour contract, often written in English, which ‘coolies’ signed or, most
often, marked with an X or a fingerprint, allowed the imperial state to make the case
that ‘coolies’ had voluntarily become indentured. Labour contracts thus provided
the documentary proof  that the ‘coolie’ system was not a new form of  slavery. So
central was the contract of indenture to the operation—and legitimisation—of the
‘coolie’ labour trade that those recruited through it from British India referred to
one another as girmit (or ‘agreement’). These contracts of indenture further disciplined
‘coolie’ labour. The contract that bound workers to employers gave the latter much
more power to enforce its terms. The imperial state gave employers access to the
power of its courts and prisons to judge, punish and discipline those ‘coolie’
workers accused of not fulfilling their part of the contract. Employers could legally
use corporal and other forms of punishment/abuse to enforce the compliance of
‘coolies’.
Along with these contracts, which ideologically removed the ‘coolie’ labour trade
from the institution of slavery it was designed to replace, it is also important to
note that it was the state’s regulations on both immigration and emigration that
were central to not only disciplining ‘coolie’ workers but also ensuring the legitimacy
of the labour system under which they were recruited. Without signing contracts
of indenture, workers from British India were neither permitted to leave British
India nor to enter British Mauritius. Ironically, then, while ‘coolies’ were portrayed
as ‘free’, the very thing—the contract of indenture—that made them ‘coolies’ also
ensured the unfree labour relationship they worked under.
designed to discipline workers and required their obedience and loyalty to their
contracted employer. Infringements of the contract were punishable by the courts
and the punishment was often a jail sentence of hard labour. Such statutes remained
in effect in England until 1875 when criminal sanctions for premature departure
from a contracted place of  employment were eliminated (Steinfeld, pp. 115, 160).
25 D S Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the refugee crisis, 1938–1941, University of
Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1968.
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Yet, despite the official rhetoric, it was clear that neither the Mauritius immigration
controls nor the emigration controls of the British Indian government protected
‘coolie’ labourers. Not only were conditions inhumane and dangerous in this new
Middle Passage, mortality rates where ‘coolies’ laboured were very high. ‘Coolies,’
as Lisa Lowe notes, ‘would be shipped on the same vessels that had brought the
slaves they were designed to replace; some would fall to disease, die, suffer abuse,
and mutiny; [and those] who survived the three-month voyage would encounter
coercive, confined conditions upon arrival.’26 Thus, as soon as knowledge of  the
new trade in ‘coolie’ labour became public, anti-slavery campaigns reignited in both
the British metropole and in the British colonies, especially in British India. Imperial
state claims that ‘coolies’ were moving voluntarily and were working freely were
challenged.
However, it was ending coerced migration—the kind clearly evident in the Atlantic
slave trade—which became the focus of these campaigns. A report in the Anti-
Slavery Reporter stated, that ‘[i]t should be observed, that, of  all the thousands who
have hitherto gone to Mauritius, or other colonies, there is no proof afforded that
any of  them went voluntarily; but, on the contrary, decisive evidence that they were
either kidnapped for that purpose, and by force put on board vessels employed in
transporting them, or were obtained by the most fraudulent statements.’27 Their
focus on extra-economic coercion and fraud worked to valorise a particular notion
of freedom, one defined by the absence of direct force. But while some ‘coolie’
labourers were undoubtedly pressed into labour, most had been displaced by
colonisation and sought to replace what they had lost with new livelihoods. Indeed,
tens of millions of people were on the move in search of a means of subsistence.
While alluding to the ‘helplessness’ of  the labourers caused by poverty, campaigners
avoided discussion over the source of their impoverishment. In particular, the vast
majority of anti-slavery campaigners paid scant attention to existing imperialist
conditions, precisely the conditions that might make moving preferable to staying.
Instead, comments focused on the difficulties caused by their migration. In various
issues of  the British And Foreign Anti-Slavery Society papers, readers were told: ‘At
present their families for want of  food, are begging from door to door’; ‘family is
in great distress for maintenance’; ‘starving for want of  food’; ‘their families have
taken menial service (become slaves?) for maintenance’; ‘and these remarks are not
confined to a family here and there, but are applicable to a great extent to all the
families left at home by the Coolies on their shipment for Mauritius.’
26 L Lowe, ‘The Intimacies of Four Continents’ in A L Stoler, Haunted by Empire:
Geographies of  intimacy in North American history, Duke University Press, Durham and
London, 2006, pp. 191–212.
27 British And Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, Emigration from India: The export of  coolies,
and other labourers, to Mauritius, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1842/2014,
p. 47.
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Most campaigners concerned with the ‘coolie’ labour system argued that the only
way to ensure the freedom of workers from India and prevent their abuse was to
further reduce their freedom to move. In other words, a worker’s freedom from
slavery in British India depended on their being immobilised. This immobilisation
was presented as a ‘protection’ for workers, many of whom were dealing with the
colonial transformation of the rural economy in India. It was also represented as
the emigrants’ own preference. To buttress such a conclusion, campaigners argued
that mobility itself  was anathema to people in India. For example, the Anti-Slavery
Reporter of 20 October 1841 argued that the ‘population, so far from desiring to
emigrate from their native land to distant and foreign parts, are utterly averse to it.
They even object to go to distant and unknown sections of  their own country.’28
Again, this flew in the face of actual events on the ground where millions of people
were on the move as part of  their survival strategies.
Initially, the efforts of  anti-slavery campaigners were successful. Convinced that
British Indian government regulations were insufficient to protect workers from
India, campaigners successfully pressured the government to appoint a special
committee to inquire into the issue in 1838. Campaigners were successful in
convincing the committee, whose subsequent report stated that, ‘We conceive it to
be distinctly proved beyond dispute that the Coolies and other natives exported to
Mauritius and elsewhere, were, generally speaking, induced to come to Calcutta, by
misrepresentation and deceit, practiced upon them by native crimps29… employed by
European and Anglo-Indian undertakers and shippers, who were mostly cognizant
of these frauds, and who received a very considerable sum per head for each Coolie
imported.’30 Thus, citing fraud and misrepresentation—and not the conditions
created by British imperialism—on 29 May 1839, the movement of workers from
British India engaged in manual labour was prohibited. Any person effecting their
emigration was made liable to the substantial fine of 200 rupees or three months
in jail. While a few people moved to Mauritius via the French enclave of Pondicherry
in southern India, their movement out of India was effectively halted.
The planters in Mauritius and the Caribbean worked hard to overturn the ban,
while the anti-slavery committee worked just as hard to uphold it. Under intense
pressure from planters, on 2 December 1842, the governors of the East India
Company reversed their earlier decision and the emigration of ‘coolies’ was again
permitted from the ports of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras to Mauritius. However,
as a way to avoid comparisons with slavery, newly-minted agents titled Protectors
28 Ibid., p. 46.
29 The term ‘crimps’ appears to have first been used in the Atlantic slave trade and also
in eighteenth century British Navy and Merchant Marine shipping to designate a
sub-contractor who secured slaves, seamen or, in this case, ‘coolies’ for contracted
indentured labour.
30 British And Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, p. 49.
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of Emigrants were appointed at each departure point. Likewise, an office of the
Protector of Immigrants in Mauritius was established. That year, almost 35,000
people were shipped as indentured ‘coolies’ from India to Mauritius. The ‘coolie’
trade expanded rapidly, as did sugar production on Mauritius. By the mid-1850s,
sugar production surpassed 100,000 tons a year.31 A ship transporting ‘coolie’
labourers arrived every few days in Mauritius and such a large number of ‘coolie’
labourers caused a backlog in processing. Between 1834 and 1867, it is estimated
that approximately 366,000 indentured labourers from India had entered Mauritius.
The ‘coolie’ trade soon expanded to become part of the global supply chain of
workers for the expanding British Empire. By 1844, ‘coolies’ were shipped to
British colonies in the West Indies, including Jamaica, Trinidad and Demerara.
Eventually, ‘coolie’ labourers from Asia were transported throughout the British
Empire and, to a lesser extent, to the French, German, Dutch, Danish, Spanish,
Portuguese, Belgian and US colonies.32
Early imperial-state regulation of the movement of labour represented as
‘free’ thus took place in the historical conjuncture of the end of slavery and
investors’ continued need for a cheapened and legally disciplined workforce. While
campaigners were unsuccessful in shutting down the ‘coolie’ labour trade, an
outcome which did not provide for new livelihoods for the people rendered
immobile, they did contribute enormously to the portrayal of workers engaged in
migration as simple, ignorant and vulnerable and thus in need of the protection of
both contracts and controls to limit their mobility. In this sense, the first effort to
exert state sovereignty over the in-migration of persons into state territories took
place in relation to limiting the mobility of workers, all in the guise of protecting
them.
The Logics of Constraining Free Mobility
While the contemporary figure of the immigrant—the one that current campaigns
to end ‘modern-day slavery’ wish to protect—was initiated by the British imperial
state, it is under the nation-state’s ‘logic of  constraint’ that the category of
immigrant was cemented as a crucial state and labour market category.33 It is
after the rise of nationalism in the eighteenth century as evident in the French
Revolution—and the formation of  the world’s first nation states in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century—when pressure to enact more and more
regulations and restrictions intensified. The first national controls on immigration
began in the Americas, where former colonies had successfully transformed
31 Allen, p. 12.
32 Potts, p. 67.
33 Mongia, p. 403.
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themselves into ‘self-governing’ states, which by the late nineteenth century had
nationalised their sovereignty. Peru was the first in 1853, followed in quick
succession by other states across the Americas. By the period between the two
world wars, each state in the Americas had nationalised its sovereignty. Each of
these new nation states announced their newfound national sovereignty by
enacting racist immigration controls, often with a highly gendered component to
them. With the institutionalisation of the idea that ‘nations’ were units of
homogenous so-called races, states became intent on regulating and restricting
the movement of negatively racialised people into their claimed territories and in
regulating the sexual ‘respectability’ of the women they allowed to enter.
From the start, racist immigration controls were intended to keep ‘undesirables’
out of state spaces undergoing the process of nationalisation. Although negatively
racialised people were unwanted as co-members of the nation, their labour power
was, nonetheless, very much needed. Immigration regulations and restrictions,
thus, not only worked to deny them entry (which they certainly did at particular
moments in various national histories) but worked to place those who did get in
into new state categories of ‘immigrant’ that ensured that their labour power
would be regulated as ‘immigrant labour’ within the state.
As with the first British imperial regulations and restrictions on the free mobility
of co-imperial subjects from British India, many of the first national controls on
immigration often concerned those who were recruited as ‘coolies’. For example,
the first constraints against people’s free entry to the United States—the 1875 Page
Act—expressly barred the entry of two categories of persons: ‘coolies’ from China
and women deemed to be ‘prostitutes’. Not dissimilar to anti-slavery campaigns
arguing to limit the mobility of people in British India, US trade unions, whose
membership was largely limited to white male workers, came to represent ‘coolie’
labour as a ‘relic of  slavery’ and sought to limit their entry.34
By the late nineteenth century, white male workers had largely escaped the unfree
employment relations established by various Masters and Servants Acts. In winning
their ‘freedom’ against the continued unfreedom of Others, they insisted on the
exclusion of all those who were still labouring under unfree employment relations.
As I have discussed elsewhere,35 the process by which free labour was normalised
was both relational and highly ideological as it was founded in the emergence of
national, liberal styles of governance with their racialised and gendered criteria for
national subjectivities. Freedom and unfreedom were constituted through the
establishment of political hierarchies shaped by now-national immigration policies.
34 Lowe, p. 202.
35 N Sharma, Home Economics: Nationalism and the making of ‘migrant workers’ in Canada,
University of  Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006.




Regulations against ‘coolies’ were the first contemporary inter-statal regulations on
immigration. It is when the ‘coolie’ recruitment system replaced the slave labour
system that the figure of  the immigrant came into being. The immigrant was the
person whose movement across space was regulated, initially in the early nineteenth
century by the British imperial state eager to facilitate and legitimate the availability
of a highly disciplined and therefore cheapened workforce of ‘coolies’ and, by the
end of  the nineteenth century, by nationalising states (such as the United States)
intent on legitimising a racialised view of the now-national political community
while simultaneously cheapening a negatively racialised workforce. The regulation
of human movement entailing something we can term a system of migration came
into being with the regulation of workers largely from various parts of Asia, the
vast majority of whom were recruited through the ‘coolie’ labour system.
The nation-state’s ‘monopoly of  the legitimate means of  movement’ did not
target all people on the move but only those grouped together through prevailing
ideas of  race as well as normative ideas of  gender (e.g. restrictions on the entry of
‘prostitutes’).36 The migrant was, thus, from the outset, a negatively racialised and
gendered figure. That this figure was deemed undesirable and ‘unassimilable’
demonstrates the centrality of ideas of nation-ness to the racialisation and gendering
of  immigration controls. Crucially, then, it was through the regulation of  the
international mobility of ‘undesirables’ that states nationalised their sovereignty
and the subjectivities of those who believed they belonged to the nation that such
states purported to rule for. Neither regulations on emigration nor restrictions on
immigration were meant to stop the movement of workers, however, but only to
ensure that their labour was sufficiently disciplined. State regulations and restrictions
were not only about numbers but also about the rights accorded by the state to
various groups of  immigrant workers. Importantly, the regulation of  migration
arose alongside the growing nationalisation of states from the late nineteenth/
early twentieth and into the twenty-first century. In the process, ideas about mobility
and people’s movements changed profoundly.
Obscured in efforts to regulate and restrict human mobility was, as Ellen Meiskins
Wood cogently acknowledges, the fact that ‘the distinctive and dominant characteristic
of  the capitalist market is not opportunity or choice but, on the contrary, compulsion.
Material life and social reproduction in capitalism are universally mediated by the
market, so that all individuals must in one way or another enter into market
relations in order to gain access to the means of  life.’37 The immobilisation of
36 J Torpey, The Invention of  the Passport: Surveillance, citizenship, and the state, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
37 E M Wood, The Origin of  Capitalism: A longer view, Verso, London, 2002, p. 7.
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persons seeking a livelihood, all the while maintaining, indeed intensifying
capitalist market practices that entailed expropriation and exploitation was, and
remains, the height of  hypocrisy.
Today, we have a globalised system of  immigration controls in which it is nearly
impossible to move freely across now-nationalised borders, particularly for those
left with little but their labour power to sell in the capitalist marketplace. As Fran ois
Cr peau has well noted, ‘We have established all the barriers we could think of  to
prevent refugees [and other categories of immigrants] from coming: imposition
of visas for all refugee-producing countries, carrier sanctions, “short stop opera-
tions”, training of airport or border police personnel, lists of “safe third coun-
tries”, lists of “safe countries of origin”, readmission agreements with neighbouring
countries forming a “buffer zone”, immigration intelligence sharing, reinforced
border controls, armed interventions on the high seas…[,] military intervention...’38
and, as recently announced, even efforts by the European Union to launch attacks
against ships used to carry people attempting to move from Northern Africa to
Europe.39 Notably, this last—but also many other—border control measures have
been rationalised as efforts to protect migrants and to ‘end trafficking’.40 In this,
much was learnt from the earliest imperial efforts to regulate and restrict free
human mobility. Now, as then, the trope of  ‘rescue’ is a powerful one in
legitimating even murderous actions against those rendered as immigrants.
Yet, the greatest danger to people trying to cross national borders is the
immigration policies and policing of nation states. Moreover, the categories that
nation states slot most migrating people into—‘illegal’ or ‘temporary foreign worker’
being two of  the largest—are the greatest threats to their liberty. Being categorised
as ‘illegal’ or ‘temporary’ is what entraps a growing number of people on the move
38 F Cr peau, ‘The Fight Against Migrant Smuggling: Migration containment over refugee
protection’ in J van Selm, K Kamanga, J Morrison, A Nadig, S Spoljar-Vrzina and L
van Willigen, The Refugee Convention at Fifty. A view from forced migration studies, Lexington
Books, Lanham, 2003, pp. 173–185, p. 174.
39 Moreover, as Thierry Tardy notes, the EU Council established ‘Operation Sophia’ on
18 May 2015. ‘The operation’s mandate,’ he documents, ‘is to contribute to the
“disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in
the Southern Central Mediterranean” by “efforts to identify, capture and dispose of
vessels used or suspected of being used by smugglers”. The operation focuses on
smugglers rather than on the rescue of  the migrants themselves.’ See: T Tardy, Operation
Sophia. Tackling the refugee crisis with military means, European Union Institute for
Security Studies, 2015.
40 I Traynor, ‘EU draws up plans for military attacks on Libya targets to stop migrant
boats’, The Guardian, 10 May 2015, retrieved 10 May 2015, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/10/eu-considers-military-attacks-on-
targets-in-libya-to-stop-migrant-boats?CMP=share_btn_fb.
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into substandard working and living conditions while severely limiting their rights
and mobility. Thus, national immigration policies legislate the conditions that
make some people ‘cheap’ or even ‘disposable’. Quite simply put: without
national immigration policies, there would be no such group we know as immigrants
who could be subordinated, scapegoated and abused—or rescued.
We learn about none of  these real-life dangers and exploitations from the
ever-multiplying accounts of ‘human trafficking’ and ‘modern-day slavery’,
however. The discursive state practice of ending trafficking or ‘modern-day slavery’
is wholly reliant on the acceptance of the legitimacy of national immigration
regimes and their lack of concern with the gross disparities and exploitation organised
by capitalist social relations, relations of which human mobility has always been
and remains an integral part. Anti-trafficking policies do a great disservice to
migrating people, especially the most vulnerable, and do much to divert our attention
away from the practices of nation states and employers and to channel our energies
in support of a law-and-order agenda of ‘getting tough’ on ‘traffickers’—even to
the extent of  attacking them militarily.
In this way, anti-trafficking measures are ideological: they render the plethora of
immigration and border controls as unproblematic and attempt to place them
outside of the bounds of politics. The reasons why it is so difficult and increasingly
dangerous for people to move safely or to live securely in the places they move to is
brushed aside while nation states rush to criminalise ‘traffickers’ and (largely) ‘send
home’ (i.e. deport) ‘victims of  trafficking’. Today, as in past discourses of  ‘protecting
coolies’, the discursive practices of ‘anti-trafficking’ spectacularly fail the needs of
people by failing to call for their free mobility across space and their freedom within
nationalised labour markets.
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